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Abstract: In this article, an account of the architecture of the 
cognitive contamination system is offered, according to which the 
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including in cases of mere visual contact with disgusting objects. It 
is argued that this architecture is important for explaining the 
content, logic, distribution, and persistence of maternal impression 
beliefs—according to which foetal defects are caused by the 
pregnant mother’s experiences and actions—which in turn provide 
important evidence of the architecture of the cognitive 
contamination system.   
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While disgust has been the focus of a great deal of attention in the philosophy of psychology and 
moral psychology in the last 40 years, insufficient attention has been paid to the precise nature of 
contamination thinking.  
In this article, I undertake two principal tasks. First, I offer an account of the architecture 
of the cognitive contamination system according to which the system has the ability to generate 
two kinds of contamination representations: contamination beliefs, which are sensitive to the 
norms of contamination; and contamination aliefs, which are generated by disgust and are not 
sensitive to such norms and so can be radically promiscuous in that they can be occasioned through 
e.g. mere visual contact with a disgusting object. Second, I argue that this account of the architecture 
of the cognitive contamination system is needed to explain why the maternal impression theory of 
teratology arose, and that maternal impression beliefs in turn provide important evidence for this 
account. The maternal impression theory posited that unsightly marks, deformities, diseases and 
even immoral behavioral traits in children are caused by the experiences and actions of the 
pregnant mother. 1  
 
1 In the following, I largely assume that maternal impression beliefs are false, and therefore to be explained away. It is 
important to be clear from the outset that I do not wish to suggest that the idea that a pregnant mother’s experiences 
can affect the development of her unborn child is entirely false. A growing number of studies have shown that a 
mother’s prenatal emotions, and in particular anxiety, can affect her child’s brain development and their chances of 
developing psychopathy (see e.g. O’Donnell et al., 2014). In principle, experiences of disgust might be among the 
kinds of maternal emotional experiences that could contribute to such pathologies, perhaps particularly to the extent 
that disgust proneness is linked to anxiety disorders. Notwithstanding this, I assume that maternal impression beliefs—
such as those where deformities are caused by single experiences of similar deformities—are clearly false (even if 
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More specifically, in the first part of this paper, I provide an account of the relationship 
between disgust and one of the laws of sympathetic magic—the law of contagion—in terms of 
contamination beliefs and contamination aliefs. Based on this characterization, in the second part 
of the paper I argue that disgust can explain a number of features of the phenomenon of maternal 
impression beliefs, including: (i) why they have the precise content that they do in terms of the 
causes and effects of maternal impressions and the mechanisms of mitigating their effects, (ii) why 
they have reliably appeared across cultures in scientists and the folk alike, (iii) why they tend to 
occur just when they do within cultures, and (iv) why they have proved surprisingly resistant to 
rational deflation. I conclude by discussing the best explanation of maternal impression beliefs: I 
deploy my account of the cognitive contamination system in my explanation of why fear, rather 
than disgust, has nonetheless been more commonly identified as the cause of maternal 
impressions, and discuss why a disgust-based explanation is preferable to domain-general 
explanations.  
The relationship between disgust and the maternal impression theory of teratology not 
only illustrates how important present-day psychology and philosophy of psychology are for 
understanding certain cases in the history of science and medicine—and particularly those where 
cognitive heuristics have led scientific thinking astray—but also reveals how some cases in the 
history of science and medicine can provide important opportunities to advance our understanding 
of certain psychological phenomena.  
 
§2. Disgust and Contamination Representations 
 
Disgust is a basic emotion that is characterized by: the physiological concomitants of nausea; 
feelings of revulsion and of oral incorporation of something offensive; parasympathetic nervous 
activation; a distinctive facial expression—which includes gaping of the mouth, retraction of the 
upper lip, and wrinkling of the nose; behavioral avoidance and purification; and contamination 
representations (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Levenson et al., 1990; Rozin, 
Lowery & Ehert, 1994; Stark et al., 2005; Rozin et al., 2008; for an account of disgustingness, see 
Doran, in press).  
Disgust is thought to have evolved from the distaste response (Rozin & Fallon, 1987) to 
defend us from physical contaminants—and in particular pathogens (Curtis & Biran, 2001)—as 
well as moral, social and spiritual contamination (Rozin et al., 2008).  
One of the central features of disgust is that it obeys the magical law of contagion, 
according to which “physical contact between the source and the target results in the transfer of 
some effect or quality (essence) from the source to the target” (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000: p. 3). 
Rozin et al. (1986) showed that dipping a dead, sterilized, cockroach—which is experienced as 
disgusting—in a glass of juice rendered it disgusting. In fact, the contact of the juice with the glass 
intermediary was sufficient to make the glass itself a source of disgust. 
Non-disease-based elicitors of disgust, including moral viciousness, have also been shown 
to be regarded as contaminating. Rozin, Markwith and McCauley (1994) found that participants 
displayed a reluctance to wear a freshly laundered jumper that they were told had been briefly worn 
by a morally vicious individual or someone who had lost their leg in an automobile accident. More 
recently, and demonstrating the specific link between moral disgust and contamination, Tapp and 
Occhipinti (2016) found that people were less likely to eat from cutlery that had been used by a 
moral transgressor, and that this effect was uniquely mediated by feelings of disgust (with no 
mediation occurring for feelings of sadness and anger).  
Importantly, in many of these studies, participants continue to act as if the contacted 
objects are contaminated, despite acknowledging that they pose no danger to them. That is, 
disgust-induced contamination behavior is in some ways resistant to attempts to override it 
 
common) and warrant a deflationary explanation. One of my tasks in this article is to provide just such an epidemiology 
of these beliefs.  
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rationally (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000: p. 23). Nevertheless, given the sheer number of potential 
contaminants in our environment, we manage such contamination behaviors in at least three main 
ways: by directing attention away from potential contaminants (as in the case of the dog owner 
who doesn’t think about where their dog has been when they kiss them); by reframing potential 
contaminants (as in the case of thinking of mouldy cheeses as ‘blue’ cheeses or mildly decayed beef 
as ‘aged’ or ‘matured’); or by deploying culturally sanctioned standards for contamination (such as 
the kosher rule of contamination being constituted by 1 or more parts contaminant to 60 parts 
non-contaminant) (see e.g. Rozin & Fallon, 1987: pp. 31-2).   
We are ‘pre-prepared’ (Seligman, 1970) for the capacity for representing contamination. 
This capacity is acquired rapidly in all humans irrespective of variations in physical, social or 
cultural environments and even under degraded acquisition conditions such as minimal learning 
trials or the absence of conscious effort (see e.g. Shweder, 1977: p. 638). Indeed, it is thought that 
this pre-preparation evolved from disgust as part of the suite of cognitive mechanisms that humans 
have been endowed with to deal with the threat of infection, and that disgust’s co-option to deal 
with interpersonal contaminants permitted the expansion of contamination thinking to these 
domains too (e.g. Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000: pp. 19 and 22). 
Notwithstanding these innate constraints, culturally-acquired information is able to shape 
the cognitive contamination system in certain respects, as evident from the ontogeny of the system. 
The cognitive contamination system is thought to emerge at around 4-years of age (Siegal & Share, 
1990), once children acquire the ability to represent invisible entities. After this, children calibrate 
their contamination system according to the relevant culturally-transmitted knowledge that they 
are exposed to. 
At first, children tend to think that contamination can occur through mere physical 
proximity, and that once it has occurred, contamination is irreversible. In at least those cultures 
where there is a modern scientific understanding of infectious diseases, children come to represent 
physical actions such as boiling as being able to purify the objects, and increasingly represent 
physical contact as being necessary for contamination. Springer and Belk (1994) found that 3-4-
year-old children were more likely than 7-8-year-olds to think that a fly merely coming close to a 
glass of juice would make the juice noxious. Similarly, Hejmadi et al. (2004) found that most 4-
year-old Indian children rejected a glass of lemonade that has been held by a stranger and tended 
to reject physical methods of purifying contamination events, whereas 8-year-old children did not 
tend to reject lemonade that had been held by a stranger, and tended to accept boiling as a method 
of purification. 
Notwithstanding these advances during development, even adults who have acquired the 
relevant scientific beliefs have been shown to represent mere proximity as sufficient for 
contamination, at least in certain contexts. Rozin et al. (1992) found that the thought of wearing a 
new and freshly laundered jumper purchased, though not actually touched, by an individual with 
AIDS was more unpleasant than the thought of wearing an equivalent jumper owned by a healthy 
individual. Similarly, Hebl and Mannix (2003) found that people who sat close to obese people 
were judged less favourably, and Kim and Kim (2011) found that objects which are merely close 
to a murderer are judged less favourably.   
Indeed, in certain cases of psychopathology such as contamination-related obsessive-
compulsive disorder (CR-OCD), contamination representations occur frequently in the absence 
of contact. Individuals with CR-OCD tend to experience a persistent sense of dirtiness by mere 
thoughts of contaminants such as an unwanted kiss from a stranger, being in a toilet, or unacceptable 
sexual or blasphemous thoughts (Rachman, 1994). This persistent sense of dirtiness produces 
compulsive self-cleaning behavior, which tends to continue until feelings of “not-quite-rightness” 
reduce (Wahl et al., 2008) and tends to be resistant to rational disconfirmation: individuals suffering 
from CR-OCD are able to recognize and declare that their compulsions and actions are 
irrational—they know that they have not come into physical contact with a contaminant and that 
their washing behavior would have removed any contaminant that were present in any case 
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(Rachman, 2004: p. 1236). CR-OCD occurs on a continuum of severity and is thought to be the 
result of abnormal functioning of psychological capacities that are universal in humans (see, Gibbs, 
1996, for a review). Specifically, CR-OCD is thought to be caused by a range of factors, including, 
most prominently: a more reactive disgust system (for a summary of the evidence see Cisler et al., 
2009), broad deficits in executive functions (e.g. Snyder et al., 2015), and a tendency to appraise 
themselves as being more susceptible to contracting illnesses and thinking that they will be severely 
affected by them (e.g. Summerfeld et al., 2014). Indeed, some evidence suggests that elevated 
disgust sensitivity may be crucial among these causes. Deacon and Olatunji (2007), for example, 
found that disgust sensitivity mediated the relationship between beliefs in contamination likelihood 























A cognitive contamination system populated by two kinds of contamination representation is best 
able to make sense of these findings (see figure 1 for an illustration of the cognitive architecture). 
The representations of contamination that arise from disgust—and indeed, are proportional in 
strength to the activation of the disgust system—are what Gendler (2008) calls aliefs, though they 
may also be accompanied by, or themselves generate, beliefs. As such, they arise automatically, 
and tend to guide behavior, without an individual assenting to the idea that the object presents a 
genuine danger of contamination, or even where an individual assents to the contrary proposition.2 
Unlike contamination beliefs, contamination aliefs are promiscuous: they may be generated even 
when there is no perceived physical contact between the source and recipient. Rather, 
contamination aliefs obey a looser logic of proximity according to which contamination is 
attributed to objects that are merely close by. Or, to put it another way, they are generated and 
give rise to functional outputs in a manner which is insensitive to the norms of contamination—
such as the source actually being contaminating, the recipient being sensitive to the source, and 
there being physical contact between the source and the recipient. 
The capacity for contamination aliefs is pre-prepared and emerges early in development. 
As culturally transmitted norms for contamination are acquired, contamination beliefs come to be 
constrained by the norms prescribed by such knowledge, as do contamination behaviors. As a 
 
2 For a discussion of whether alief can be distinguished from other proposed constructs, such as implicit beliefs, see, 



























Objects that satisfy contamination norms 
Figure 1. An illustration of the architecture of the cognitive contamination system, where arrows represent causal 
relationships. 
Mere contact—broadly 
understood to include visual, 
auditory, olfactory, tactile, or 
cognitive “contact”—with 
disgust elicitor 
Sensitivity of recipient to be contaminated by source 
Potential of source to contaminate recipient 
Physical contact between source and recipient 
Contamination 
behaviors 
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result, contamination beliefs and aliefs functionally dissociate. However, since contamination aliefs 
are generated automatically, they continue to tend to give rise to contamination behaviors and 
exert a pressure towards contamination beliefs even once the capacity for mature contamination 
beliefs arise. 
 This architecture also neatly explains how it is that contamination behavior goes wrong in 
cases of contamination-related obsessive-compulsive disorder, given what we know about the 
causes of this disorder. In individuals with CR-OCD, their disgust systems generate contamination 
aliefs more frequently and strongly, even by mere thoughts of contaminants, which give rise to a 
sense of dirtiness, and produce a tendency to wash. This increased frequency and intensity of 
disgust system activation itself shapes the representations of the norms of contamination in these 
individuals, giving rise to beliefs that they are more susceptible to contamination, and will be more 
severely affected by it. Notwithstanding these modifications, their beliefs about contamination still 
reflect prevailing norms to an extent, and remain available to central cognitive processes. As a 
result, in many cases, individuals suffering from CR-OCD are able to recognize and declare that 
their compulsions and actions are irrational. Yet, due to their deficits in executive function and in 
particular response inhibition, they face difficulties in bringing their representations of the 
satisfaction of these norms of contamination to bear on their behavior (including by employing 
the cognitive strategies for managing contagion behavior outlined by, e.g. Rozin and Fallon, 1987, 
discussed above). As a result, they tend to persist in their washing behaviors until the sense of 
dirtiness—which like all affect-based phenomena is subject to adaptation—reduces.  
But just how promiscuous are contamination aliefs, even in non-clinical populations? I 
propose that they are more radically promiscuous than has been appreciated until now. In addition 
to attributing contamination to objects that are merely spatially near to the disgusting object (as 
demonstrated by e.g. Kim and Kim, 2011), disgust is sufficient to token contamination to distal 
objects, and indeed, to the individual experiencing the disgust directly—that is to say, 
independently of any physical contact with the source or any intermediary, or even mere proximity 
to them. 
Some support for the radical promiscuity claim is provided by Jones and Fitness (2008), 
who found that contemplating moral transgressions made products related to cleanliness more 
appealing, and Fairbrother et al. (2004) who found that contemplating a non-consensual kiss led 
to feelings of dirtiness and self-cleaning behaviors even in non-clinical populations. One tempting 
way of explaining these findings is that merely contemplating disgustingness in the form of moral 
viciousness makes people alief that they are contaminated, and so increases the desirability of 
hygiene products and behaviors that would neutralize this contamination. Further support for the 
self-contamination interpretation of these findings comes from the fact that disgust itself is 
thought to involve a sense of oral incorporation (Rozin et al., 2008), even where the disgusting 
object has not been consumed and indeed where the disgusting object is not something that could 
be consumed. Even morally disgusting stimuli have been shown to give rise to the facial expression 
characteristic of disgust (Chapman et al., 2009), which is thought to have evolved from the 
concomitants of gustatory and olfactory rejection (Rozin, Lowery & Ebert, 1994). As disgust has 
been thought to prevent oral incorporation in an anticipatory manner by giving rise to the 
physiological concomitants of oral rejection—that is, before oral incorporation has taken place or 
even where it isn’t possible (Rozin & Fallon, 1987)—merely experiencing some of the components 
of disgust may contribute to a sense of self-contamination (though this may not be sufficient in 
itself).3  
 
3 To return to the discussion of contamination through physical contact with morally disgusting objects (see the 
discussion of Tapp and Occhipinti, 2016, and Rozin, Markwith and McCauley, 1994, above), the cognitive architecture 
of the contamination system proposed here may also help to cast light on some aspects of the findings that have been 
proposed to count against moral contamination. Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla (2017, reported in Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018 
and Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla, 2021) found that participants asked to imagine wearing a Nazi armband would prefer 
to wear the armband under, rather than over, their clothes, and that the majority offered reputation-based reasons for 
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This framework is crucial, I propose, for explaining maternal impression beliefs. In turn, 
where recent findings on the effects of disgust provide some evidence for the radical promiscuity 
of contamination aliefs, maternal impression beliefs provide important evidence where mere visual 
contact is sufficient for the generation of contamination representations, as well as the structure 
of the cognitive contamination system generally.  In the second part of this paper, I turn to make 
the case for this. 
 
§3. The Disgust-Based Explanation of the Maternal Impression Theory of Teratology 
 
Across history and cultures, it has been believed that unsightly marks, deformities, diseases and 
even immoral behavioral traits in children are caused by the experiences and actions of the 
pregnant mother—the so-called maternal impression theory of teratology. Indeed, in addition to 
being present in folk beliefs, the maternal impression theory was prominent in early modern 
medicine, and even had prominent advocates in Western medicine up until the early 20th century.  
 Maternal impression beliefs come in two broad kinds. On the one hand, so-called ‘maternal 
imagination’ beliefs are those maternal impression beliefs where the cause of a foetus’ defect is 
thought to be the experiences and imaginings of the pregnant women. On the other hand, what 
might be termed ‘maternal action’ beliefs are those beliefs where the cause of a foetus’ defect is 
thought to be the action of the pregnant mother, either prenatally or, in some cases, postnatally. 
In what follows, I defend two principal claims. First, disgust, and more precisely the 
radically promiscuous contamination aliefs that it generates, are important for explaining the 
occurrence of maternal impression beliefs. In the case of maternal imagination beliefs, one 
important causal route is as follows: Visual exposure of disgusting objects to pregnant women 
gives rise to contamination aliefs in pregnant women and third-party observers alike that the 
pregnant mother and her foetus in turn are contaminated. Similarly, in the case of maternal action 
beliefs, one important causal route is as follows: Pregnant women’s physical contact with 
disgusting objects or their performance of disgusting actions elicits disgust, and contamination 
aliefs in third party observers that the pregnant mother and her foetus in turn are contaminated.4 
In each case, just as physical contact of a disgusting liquid is represented as contaminating the 
vessel that contains it in Rozin et al.’s (1986) studies, seeing or doing disgusting things are 
represented to contaminate the pregnant mother, and as she is the vessel for the foetus, the foetus 
itself.  
In the following sub-sections, I lay out three lines of evidence for this claim: (a), the 
elicitors of disgust selectively correspond with the causes identified in maternal impression beliefs; 
 
their choice over contamination-based reasons (with 60% of participants responding “not at all” for the latter). One 
reason for the latter result might be that in asking for reasons, which are what participants are willing to rationally assent 
to, the norms of contamination would have needed to be satisfied for participants to offer contamination-based 
reasons. Many participants may have found it difficult to rationally endorse the idea that there are such things as ‘evil 
essences’ let alone contaminating evil essences. And since participants would already imagine touching the armband in 
putting it on (in either configuration), and contamination is dose-insensitive, it is not clear that differences in choice 
of armband location would be sensitive to contamination aliefs.   
4 It is important to stress that maternal impression beliefs are multiply realizable. Another important causal pathway 
from disgust to both maternal imagination and maternal action beliefs is likely to be as follows: Visual exposure to 
newborn children with deformities, diseases and unsightly marks elicits disgust, and contamination aliefs in third party 
observers, which are reverse engineered into maternal impression beliefs. This is similar to Blondel’s (1727) claim that 
maternal imagination beliefs are the product of the informal fallacy of ad hoc, ergo propter hoc. The mere fact that the 
maternal imagining or action preceded the birth does not, however, seem likely to be sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon of maternal impression beliefs: as cognitive heuristics that are deployed automatically, contamination 
aliefs are likely to play an important role in structuring the beliefs in terms of biasing us towards certain candidate 
causes and mechanisms. Notwithstanding this, I should not be understood to be defending the claim that a disgust-
based mechanism is directly involved in generating all maternal imagination beliefs: cultural belief systems such as 
maternal impression beliefs are subject to processes of elaboration, transmission and justification (see §4), and as such, 
there are likely to be some causal pathways to generating maternal impression beliefs that do not involve disgust.   
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(b), the logic of disgust corresponds with the logic of maternal impression beliefs; and (c), disgust 
elegantly explains the distribution and persistence of maternal impression beliefs. My 
argumentative strategy is inference to the best explanation: the best explanation of these lines of 
evidence collectively is that disgust, and the contamination aliefs that partly constitute it, is important 
for the generation of maternal impression beliefs. I stress from the outset, though, that I do not 
claim that disgust is involved in the generation of every instance of a maternal impression belief 
(see fn. 4).    
 The second claim that I defend is that, where a mechanism is invoked, one of the reasons 
that this typically involves fear and shock rather than disgust is because the norms governing true 
contamination discussed in §2 are not frequently satisfied in the context of maternal impressions.  
 
§3.1. The Elicitors of Disgust Correspond with the Elicitors of Maternal Impression Beliefs 
 
Maternal impression beliefs have two invariant contents, the causal event and the effect, and less 
commonly, the mediating mechanism and remedies for mitigating the effect of the maternal 
impression once it has occurred.  
 In this sub-section, I focus on the causes and effects identified in maternal imagination 
beliefs. I show that the main classes of elicitors of disgust selectively correspond with the causes 
of maternal imagination beliefs. Moreover, I show that in most cases of maternal imagination 
beliefs, there is a symmetry between the cause and effect, such that the effect of the maternal 
imagination event resembles the cause, and the effect is itself able to cause further maternal 
impressions. 5 This is consistent with the law of contagion, according to which the essence of a 
disgusting object is represented as being transferred to any object that comes into contact with it.6 
I reserve discussion of maternal action beliefs, including their causes and effects, for the next sub-
section, as these beliefs are most economically used to illustrate the corresponding logic of 
maternal impression beliefs and disgust.   
 It is believed that while the functional outputs of the disgust system are invariant across 
cultures, the triggers of the disgust system can vary across cultures and epochs to some extent (e.g. 
Rozin, et al., 2008: p. 763). In some cultures, for example, it is permissible to touch corpses during 
funerals where in others it is forbidden. Notwithstanding this variation, it has been shown that 
disgust is commonly elicited by the following: foods—particularly decaying or taboo foods; body 
products—such as mucus, urine, faeces, blood (including menstrual blood), and vomit; ‘low’ 
animals (e.g. slugs, maggots, rats, snakes); inappropriate sex acts—including taboo practices; 
‘violations of the ideal bodily envelope’—including injury, gore, surgery, deformity, and even 
 
5 There does not need to be an effect on the foetus for representations of foetal contamination to occur. This is 
evident in e.g. some arguments that were marshalled by 19th century scientists arguing against the truth of the maternal 
impression theory: Fisher (1870: p. 263) notes the cases of two pregnant women who exposed themselves to causes 
of maternal impressions—one by feeding a pig with one leg during pregnancy, and the other by looking at and 
touching a toad while pregnant—who were pleasantly surprised to give rise to non-marked and non-deformed 
children.  
6 Two of the main ways of conceptualising what exactly is represented as being transferred in contamination aliefs are 
that it is mere disgustingness or contaminatingness, or that it is the specific disgusting entity or property that is the 
source contaminant in a given case—say, the essence of leprosy in the case of alieving contamination when making 
contact with someone with leprosy. Only the latter implies that the exact causes and effects will be alieved as being 
symmetrical. Discussions of this issue in the literature are not clear as to which conceptualization is preferred. 
Nemeroff and Rozin (1994), for example, variously characterize the representation of contagion as representing the 
“transfer of some or all [of the contaminating object’s] properties” or the transfer of “some as yet undefined 
contagious entity” (p. 159). This issue awaits determination, but the existing empirical evidence (such as it is), suggests 
that contamination aliefs may be conceptually bare, and tend to be cognitively elaborated into contamination beliefs 
according to an individual’s standing concepts. Hejmadi et al. (2004) found evidence that younger children conceive 
of contamination in terms of a “spiritual” essence, and that material conceptualizations emerge during development. 
In their work on conceptions of contamination in adulthood—which likely reflect contamination beliefs—Nemeroff 
and Rozin (1994) found evidence that people tend to conceptualize different kinds of contaminants according to 
different mental models, including a germ model, a physical residue model, and a spiritual essence model.   
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obesity; ‘reminders of death’—including contact with dead humans or animals; ‘poor hygiene’—
including dirt and germs; and moral violations—including deliberate harms and displays of excess 
(see e.g. Curtis & Biran, 2001; Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994; Tybur et al., 2009; Olatunji et al., 
2007).   
 Setting aside food and inappropriate sexual actions, which are discussed in the context of 
maternal action beliefs, these elicitors are responsible for the great majority of causes and effects 
identified in maternal imagination beliefs.  
In terms of cases of those elicitors of disgust that involve violation of the ideal bodily 
envelope or bodily products (especially blood): the sight of someone with physical deformities or 
injuries was believed to result in similar deformities or injuries in the unborn child. Roodenburg 
(1988: p.  710) cites the case of a women who gave birth to a deformed child after seeing a painting 
of a deformed child with two heads, three arms and four legs that was being paraded through the 
streets and shown for money. Indeed, in some countries such as Denmark and the US, “freak” 
shows were prohibited, as were deformed individuals from appearing in public, in order to prevent 
similarly deformed children from being born (e.g. Rublack, 1996: p. 96). Turner (1714: p. 116) 
reports the case of a woman giving birth to a child missing a hand after unexpectedly seeing the 
‘stump’ of a beggar on her coach door while pregnant (similar cases are cited by, for example, 
Roodenburg, 1988: p. 710, Rublack, 1996: p. 95 and Ballantyne, 1905: p. 123 and 124). Fisher 
(1870: pp. 250, 251, and 265) cites a number of cases where it was believed that a woman gave 
birth to a child with a hare lip as a result of seeing someone with the same affliction. Roodenburg 
(1988: p. 710) cites two cases of women who gave birth to children with deformities after seeing 
the intestines and eyes of cats, who had been run over and beaten to death, hanging out. 
Christenbery (1911) reports that one of his patients gave birth to a child with “his left thumb 
hanging to his hand by a thin pedicle of flesh” after dressing her son’s thumb, which was nearly 
cut off, save for a shred of flesh (pp. 275-6). Dabney (1890: p. 202, citing Parker, 1886) reports 
the case of a woman who gave birth to a child with film-like abdominal walls after seeing a pig rip 
its belly open on a projecting fence. Fife (1976: p. 276) records a number of cases where witnessing 
injury was believed to result in foetal deformities: one woman believed that she had given birth to 
a child with a blood tumour on its face after witnessing a man hit his wife with the blunt end of a 
hatchet.    
In terms of hygiene- and disease-based elicitors of disgust: in addition to those cases where 
the cause of the maternal imagination event is a deformity that has been caused by disease, the 
experience of decay or disease was thought to give rise to foetal conditions resembling these in 
some way, or indeed, the disease itself in the case of the latter. Pomponazzi (1930/1556: p. 149) 
records that seeing someone with leprosy was thought to give rise to a child with leprosy. 
Bondeson (1997: p. 160) notes that epilepsy in children was widely thought to be caused by the 
pregnant mother witnessing slaughtered animals falling to the floor. Roodenburg (1988: p. 701) 
and Rublack (1996: p. 96) note that seeing a ‘lunatic’ or epileptic seizure was believed to lead to 
the birth of a ‘lunatic’ or deformed child respectively. Bates (2005: p. 121) cites the case of a women 
who was believed to have given birth to a child with deformities of the abdomen after seeing the 
bloated carcass of a horse (see also reminders of death, below). Indeed, Michael de Montaigne 
(1574/1842: p. 38) argued in favour of the maternal imagination theory of teratology partly on the 
grounds that it was but a short step from the fact (as it was believed to be in 16th century France) 
that diseases were transmitted through visual contact. 
In terms of animal reminder elicitors of disgust: in addition to the mixed elicitors involving 
animals along with another kind of elicitor described above, seeing the lower animals that tend to 
elicit disgust during pregnancy was widely believed to give rise to deformities or marks resembling 
the animal in question. Roodenburg (1988) notes that seeing apes was thought to give rise to 
“rough and hairy” children, and that seeing mice and rats was believed to result in the benign hairy 
nevus (a congenital skin tumour) or other mark (p. 710; see also Ballantyne, 1905: pp. 107-8, and 
117). Fisher (1870: pp. 247-6) reports that seeing a snake was believed to result in a child with 
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staring eyes and a flickering tongue or snake-shaped birthmark. Ballantyne (1905: p. 110) records 
the widespread belief that looking at a hare was believed to result in a cleft palate and other 
deformities, and elsewhere (1891: p. 629) reports a case where the sight of a dead frog was believed 
to give rise to an anencephalic foetus. Wilson (2002: p. 2) reports the case of a woman giving birth 
to a child with a leech-shaped blemish after seeing a leech.  
In terms of elicitors of disgust that involve reminders of death: a pregnant mother’s 
experience of death was thought to mark the unborn foetus, sometimes in a way which resembles 
the death in some manner. Rublack (1996: p. 104) notes that the sight of an executed body was 
believed to cause the birth of sickly and pale children; and Ballantyne (1892: pp. 1029-1030) 
records that the sight of a dead body was thought to mark the baby in some manner.7 Clapperton 
(1875: p. 169) cites the case of a mother who witnessed the autopsy of her son, including the 
removal of his brain, and gave birth to a child with anencephaly. 
How common are the different causes of maternal impression and imagination 
phenomena? One convenient way of establishing this is to examine a sample of reported cases. 
Dabney’s survey of 90 cases of maternal impression phenomena reported in medical journals from 
1850-1886 (selected because the reports were detailed and ‘credible’8) shows that, of the 80 causal 
events reported in these cases, interacting with deformities and cases of injury or mutilation in 
some manner accounted for 70% of cases, and the paradigmatic elicitors of disgust (including 
deformities, injury to others, interactions with low animals, disease in others, and interactions with 
death) accounted for 81.3% of reported causes (summarized in Table 1). 
 
Type of object % Examples 
Deformities (congenital or acquired) and 
phenotypic irregularities in others 38 
Seeing missing fingers, arms and legs, cleft 
palate 
Injury or mutilation to another 22.8 Dressing wounds, seeing limbs amputated, witnessing an injury or surgery 
Injury to self 6.5 Burns, piercings, being touched in a firm manner 
Interaction with low animal 5.4 Interactions with rats and rabbits 
Interaction with non-low animal 5.4 Interactions with monkeys and domesticated animals (often threat-based) 
Disease to another 3.3 Seeing someone with ‘cancer between eyes’ 
Interaction with dead body 1.1 Seeing dead body 
Other 4.3 Seeing personification of devil, prisoner shackled in prison, bald head. 
No indication of object believed to 





§3.2. The Logic of Disgust Corresponds with the Logic of Maternal Impressions 
 
 
7 Indeed, for this reason, Rublack notes that gallows were moved out of the centre of some settlements (1996: p. 104). 
8 For this reason, this sample may over-represent more easily evidenced putative causes. 
Table 1. The putative causes of maternal impressions, from Dabney (1890).  
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In this sub-section, I focus on the logic that structures maternal impression beliefs, including the 
conditions under which maternal impressions are believed to arise, and the way in which they were 
believed to be remedied. I show that the logic of disgust corresponds with the logic of maternal 
impression beliefs.  
In addition to the selective correspondence between the types of elicitors of disgust and 
causes of maternal impressions, further evidence for the connection between disgust and maternal 
impression beliefs lies in the fact that the causes of maternal impression beliefs tend to be sensitive 
to a self-other distinction that is similar to the one present in disgust.  
In performing its function of guarding the boundaries of the self, disgust draws a (crude) 
distinction between self and other, which it uses to determine the potency of the common elicitors 
of disgust. A glob of my own mucus is ineffective at disgusting me compared with an otherwise 
identical glob of mucus that belongs to another; and even among things that belong to me, in 
determining whether something is self or other my disgust system is sensitive to whether the object 
is physically attached to me, along with its capacity to cross the thresholds of my body (e.g. Miller, 
2004). The clean hair on my head does not disgust me, but the self-same hair in my dinner would 
to some extent. Just as one would expect if disgust were central to the ontogeny of maternal 
impression beliefs, maternal impressions often tend to be sensitive to a similar self-other 
distinction. The pregnant women’s experience of seeing injuries to others was commonly believed 
to result in foetal deformities, but the experience of seeing injuries to her own body was not 
similarly believed to cause deformities in her offspring (Bondeson, 1997: p. 157; note also the low 
number of cases where injury to the self is identified as the cause in Table 1, especially relative to 
the likely frequency of such events). 
As laid out in §1, studies of contamination thinking have principally focused on physical 
contact—no doubt as contamination paradigmatically involves such contact—and have indeed 
demonstrated that chains of contamination can occur via intermediaries. Given this, if disgust is 
indeed important for generating maternal impression beliefs, we would expect maternal 
impressions to occur by physical contact—between the disgusting objects and the pregnant 
women, and between the pregnant woman and the foetus.  
Evidence of this is provided by maternal action beliefs, which, furthermore, feature the 
same correspondences between the causes and effects posited and the elicitors of disgust. Indeed, 
many of the cases discussed below show that the remaining classes of disgust elicitors not 
discussed in the context of maternal imagination beliefs in §3.1. specifically correspond with some 
of the causes of maternal action beliefs.   
In the case of touch-based maternal action beliefs: physical contact of a pregnant woman 
with a range of elicitors of disgust including death, low animals, and disease has been thought to 
lead to deformities resembling these elicitors in their unborn children. Fife (1976: pp. 276-7) 
records that it was believed that nursing deformed individuals was thought to result in a child who 
was similarly deformed, touching corpses was thought to result in a child who was pale and sickly, 
touching warm meat after having just killed an animal was thought to risk the viability of the foetus, 
and being touched by a snake was thought to result in a child with scaly skin and a flicking tongue. 
Ballantyne (1905: p. 117, citing Van Swieten, 1743) and Fife (1976: p. 276) note that consuming 
hares was widely thought to result in a cleft palate, touching pigs was believed to result in a child 
who grunts through its nose, and being touched by a caterpillar or mouse was thought to result in 
a birthmark resembling a caterpillar or mouse respectively. Paré (1982/1573: p. 42) reports a case 
where a pregnant woman who held a frog (until dead) was believed to have given birth to a child 
with cranial deformities resembling frogs as a result. Ballantyne (1891: pp. 629-630) cites cases 
where being touched by a deformed beggar was believed to have resulted in similar deformities in 
a child. Maubray (1724: p. 62) points out that it was considered wrong for pregnant women to 
touch, kiss, hug, carry in their laps or bosoms, squirrels, dogs, apes and the like, and Boucé (1987) 
points out that this prohibition seemed to stem from a “repulsion for a quasi-diabolical familiarity 
with unclean beasts” (p. 93).  
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Indeed, the transference logic of contamination—and the idea that there can be chains of 
contamination through intermediaries—is explicit in both some of the mechanisms that were 
thought to give rise to maternal impressions and those that were believed to remedy maternal 
impressions. Where a pregnant woman experiences an offensive object or has an excessive longing, 
it was believed that if she touched some part of her body, the child would have a birthmark 
depicting that object on the corresponding body part (Bondeson, 1997: p. 160; Ballantyne, 1905: 
p. 109; Fife, 1976: p. 279). Shaw (1981: p. 241) notes that it was believed that a woman would be 
likely to have a child with birthmarks on the face if she witnessed an animal being slaughtered 
while touching her own face. In the case of the latter, Boucé (1987: p. 93) notes that it was 
commonly believed that a pregnant mother who is impressed through touch was advised to 
transfer the mark to a more discreet location by wiping the affected part and touching another. 
In the case of maternal action beliefs where the pregnant mother is herself the source of 
the impression, a range of elicitors of disgust—including socio-moral violations, sexual activity 
and bodily products—were thought to result in defects resembling these elicitors in her offspring. 
Bondeson (1997: pp. 160-1) notes that it was thought that a pregnant woman urinating in a 
churchyard would make her child a bed wetter, stealing would result in a thief, and spilling beer 
on her clothes would give rise to an alcoholic. Roodenburg (1988) reports that coitus during 
menstruation was thought to result in a deformed child and that acting “like beasts” in only being 
interested in the pleasures of the flesh or having intercourse in “deviant” or “unseemly” ways 
would produce diseased, leprous or deformed children (p. 707; see also, Bondeson, 1997: pp. 164-
5). Indeed, Fife (1976: p. 282) notes that it was believed that merely having intercourse during 
pregnancy would result in moles on the children—one for every episode of intercourse. Bates 
(2005: p. 121, citing Fenton, 1569) notes that excessive or “filthy” cravings (such as for food) were 
believed to result in a baby with a birth mark resembling the objects of those desires or a deformed 
child (see also Bondeson, 1997: p. 165). In a case that clearly illustrates the idea that the cause of 
the transference was represented to occur through physical contact of the mother with her child, 
immoral characteristics were believed to be able to be transferred to a baby through breast-
feeding—so-called lactational heredity (Bondeson, 1997: p. 165).  
Setting aside the fact that maternal impression beliefs observe a similar self-other 
distinction to the one that is in operation in disgust, and that maternal impressions are believed to 
occur via the modality that is paradigmatic of contamination—touch—the hand of disgust is also 
clearly discernible in the logic of how to remedy impression events in some maternal impression 
beliefs.  
As would be expected if disgust were important in the ontogeny of maternal impression 
beliefs, some of the methods of coping with the effects of offensive sights involve the same 
methods that are used to deal with contamination by physical contact with disgusting objects. As 
we have seen, disgust involves the action tendencies to withdraw from the offending object and 
purify ourselves. Oldenburg (1672: p. 5000, citing Swammerdam 1672), for example, discusses the 
case of a woman who, upon seeing a black man, washed her body to prevent her child from 
becoming black (and believed that the parts of her child that turned out to be pigmented were the 
parts that she had missed)9. Indeed, practices of dealing with deformed children more generally 
manifest the link with disgust: among certain rural communities of the Indian subcontinent, 
families who beget deformed children are subject to purifying rituals (Shaw, 1981: p. 237, citing 
Dehragoda, 1978). 
 
§3.4. Disgust Explains the Distribution and Robustness of Maternal Impression Beliefs 
 
In this sub-section, I turn away from the content of maternal impression beliefs to examine their 
distribution. Having noted that maternal impression beliefs have proved surprisingly resistant to 
 
9 Members of racial minorities would likely have been a source of disgust in the 17th century across Europe (see, e.g. 
Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).  
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rational deflation, and that they are culturally universal yet vary between individuals within cultures 
in systemic ways, I argue that an account of their ontogeny featuring disgust is able to elegantly 
accommodate this state of affairs. 
The doctrine of maternal impression has consistency appeared across cultures and epochs. 
Maternal impression beliefs occur with surprising regularity of form in (at least) Scandinavian, 
German, English, South American, North American, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Eskimo, and 
African folklores, and the theory was discussed extensively in the scientific communities of the 
Netherlands, France, England, the US, and Italy (Bondeson, 1997: pp. 145, 160 & 164; Ballantyne, 
1905: pp. 105-6; Wilson, 1992: p. 83). As Ballantyne (1905) notes “it may safely be postulated that 
the belief in the potency of maternal impressions has a geographical distribution corresponding 
with that of the human race, whilst in the matter of antiquity is coeval with it” (p. 106). Indeed, in 
light of the fact that maternal imagination beliefs seem to have appeared independently in a 
number of peoples who are widely separated geographically and culturally, Warkany (1971: pp. 12-
13) suggests that such beliefs are innate.   
Maternal impression beliefs have also proved to be surprisingly resistant to rational 
deflation. A number of compelling objections to the idea that pregnant women are able to make 
impressions on their unborn children through their experiences and actions were raised by natural 
philosophers and physicians in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, even before the acceptance of germ 
theory and modern scientific understanding of the causes of congenital disorders (see e.g. Lee, 
1875: p. 167 for a pithy summary). Among the most decisive are the objections that often only 
one twin is deformed; and that experiences of causes are much more common than the deformities 
they were thought to bring about. Fisher (1870: p. 263) puts the latter objection vividly when he 
notes that “objects disgusting and shocking to behold, distorted cripples, hunchbacks, the eyeless 
and noseless, the armless and legless, those with great tumours, ulcers and horrid cancers, or 
covered with frightful scars or leprous scales, annually meet the sensitive sight of pregnant women 
at all stages of gestation, in all populous cities and towns” and that if these experiences did result 
in deformities, then after thousands of years of accumulated deformities, a great many more of us 
would be deformed by now.  
Despite absurdities in the theory such as these, the maternal impression theory continued 
to survive, with Ballantyne (1896: p. 275) noting that 143 articles on the theory appeared in 
American medical journals between 1839 and 1896 alone—with many asserting their belief in the 
veracity of maternal impressions even if they could not conceive of a plausible modus operandi for 
them. Indeed, there is evidence that maternal impression beliefs may have persisted amongst some 
of the folk in the West until recently. Shaw (1981: p. 242), for example, noted that a minority of 
women endorsed maternal impression beliefs about nevi flammeus, with some reporting that it is 
caused by contact of the mother with blood during pregnancy. 
The disgust-based theory is well placed to explain the ubiquity of maternal impression 
beliefs, their similarity of content, as well as their resistance to rational deflation across cultures 
and epochs. As we have seen, disgust is a basic emotion. As a basic emotion, the operation of 
disgust is to an interesting extent modular (Charland, 1996): it is triggered automatically in the face 
of its elicitors, and its internal operation is unaffected by the deliverances of reason. Indeed, in the 
specific case of disgust, part of the internal operation of disgust involves the generation of 
contamination aliefs.  
In light of these features of disgust, a disgust-based theory of maternal impressions predicts 
that contamination aliefs will arise in response to the universal elicitors of disgust—such as disease, 
decay and socio-moral transgressions—in an automatic and mandatory manner in people across 
cultures, and that the occurrence of these representations will be unaffected by people’s beliefs (cf 
the discussion of contamination-related OCD in §2).  
Notwithstanding the cultural universality of maternal impression beliefs, there also seems 
to be systematic variation in which kind of maternal impression beliefs tend to arise within a 
population and when. On the one hand, maternal imagination beliefs seem most common in the 
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first trimester of pregnancy, and many maternal action beliefs seem to have arisen in third-party 
observers—and principally men—rather than the pregnant women themselves. An explanation of 
maternal impressions involving disgust is capacious enough to accommodate this variation, in 
addition to the universality of maternal impressions. 
First, Bondeson (1997: pp. 167-8) notes that the majority of the tracts on maternal 
impressions were written by men, who “often emphasized the spiritual inferiority of womankind 
and the danger that woman’s perverted cravings and emotions during pregnancy could wantonly 
alter the shape of the foetus conceived in perfection by the man.” Similarly, Roodenburg (1988: p. 
707) notes that some of the beliefs about socio-moral violations arise from the moralization of sex 
by doctors and moralists, rather than the experiences of pregnant women. 
Cravings as well as actions such as urinating in a churchyard, copulation, and stealing will 
tend to give rise to disgust in people other than the pregnant woman concerned, at least where these 
actions are appraised as excessive, immoral or impure as appropriate, but are unlikely to disgust, 
and therefore give rise to contamination representations in, pregnant women themselves. As such, 
on a disgust-based explanation of maternal impressions, it is no surprise that maternal impression 
representations where the causal event is one of the pregnant mother’s actions or one of her 
cravings seem to be more likely to have arisen in people other than the pregnant woman herself.  
Second, it was believed that maternal imagination impressions tend to occur early in a 
pregnancy (see e.g. Clapperton, 1875: p. 169). In his analysis of 135 cases of alleged maternal 
imagination events recorded in medical journals and monographs, Stevenson (1992) found that in 
80 the impressing stimulus was reported as occurring in the first trimester, versus 20 and 13 in the 
second and third trimester respectively. Similarly, Dabney (1890) assessed 90 cases reported in 
medical journals between 1850-1886, and found that 56 of the maternal impressions occurred in 
the first trimester, versus 13 and 3 in the second and third trimester respectively. 
An explanation involving disgust is well placed to accommodate this distribution. Pregnant 
women become more disgust sensitive in their first trimester, perhaps in order to compensate for 
the immune suppression that is required to successfully carry a baby—so-called compensatory 
behavioral prophylaxis (Fessler et al., 2005).10 As such, pregnant women in their first trimester will 
be more likely to be disgusted by the relevant sights and alief that they, and their foetuses in turn, 
have been contaminated. 
 
§4. Why was fear, rather than disgust, believed to mediate maternal impressions? And, what’s the best explanation 
of maternal impression beliefs? 
 
In this final section, I turn to explain why fear, rather than disgust, was commonly postulated as 
the mediating mechanism for maternal impressions. For this, I suggest that the distinction between 
contamination aliefs and beliefs in the cognitive contamination system is important, and that the 
case of maternal impressions provides evidence of this architecture in turn. Furthermore, I show 
 
10 The emerging picture of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and pregnancy is complex. In early articulations 
of the compensatory behavioral prophylaxis hypothesis, it was proposed that disgust sensitivity increases in the first 
trimester (i.e. behavioral prophylaxis) due to increases in progesterone during that same period, as progesterone has 
been shown to be involved in dampening the inflammatory immune system, which is thought to function to prevent 
rejection of the paternal genetic information (e.g. Fessler et al., 2005; Fleischman & Fessler, 2011). However, recently 
Jones et al. (2018a) did not find that disgust sensitivity (as measured by Tybur et al.’s (2009) Three Domain Disgust 
Scale) tracks changing levels of progesterone over the course of the menstrual cycles of a large sample of women. It 
is now thought that self-report measures of disgust sensitivity may not be sensitive enough to detect changes, that 
progesterone may not be the mediating mechanism, and that other measures of immunocompetence—such as 
whether someone has had a recent infection—may be better placed to provide evidence for the compensatory 
behavioral prophylaxis hypothesis (Fessler & Fleischman, 2018; Jones et al, 2018b). Indeed, recent evidence supports 
some of these ideas: Milkowska et al. (2019) found that disgust sensitivity in the pathogen domain was higher for 
women whose immune systems were compromised by high levels of progesterone and a recent infection. 
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why the fear-based explanation and other domain general explanations are poorer explanations of 
the explananda outlined in §3.  
It was commonly believed that maternal impressions were caused by the state of fright (see 
e.g. Wilson, 2002: p. 2; Wilson, 1992: p. 65). The elephant man John Merrick, for example, believed 
that his deformities were caused by his mother being frightened by a parading elephant at a fair 
(Wilson, 2002: p. 14).  
There are three plausible reasons why “fright,” rather than revulsion, was most regularly 
invoked as the cause. Firstly, “fright” would have seemed to offer a more plausible explanation 
according to early modern biology at least. As arousing emotions, fear and surprise were thought 
to be able to literally move the “animal spirits” (“nervous fluid” and blood), and as a result cause 
violence to the impressionable foetus (Turner, 1714, as cited in Wilson, 1992: pp. 67-8, see also, 
Wilson, 1992: pp. 72-3). Malebranche (1997/1674), for example, thought that a pregnant woman’s 
experience of seeing someone’s bones broken on the rack caused her animal spirits to become 
animated and break her unborn son’s bones in the same places and “deprived [him] of sense” (p. 
115).11  
Second, the mechanism suggested by disgust—namely contamination—was unlikely to be 
believed even if, as I argue here, it was alieved. As I have argued in §1, contamination beliefs are 
rationally constrained by the following requirements: for the ostensible source of the 
contamination to actually be contaminating, for the recipient of the contamination to be sensitive 
to the source, and for there to be contact between the recipient and source. In the case of maternal 
impressions, the first two constraints are likely to have often been satisfied, but the third was not. 
In the case of the sensitivity constraint, for example, the malleability of the foetus compared to 
the pregnant mother was invoked to justify why maternal impressions did not affect them similarly 
(e.g. Turner, 1714: p. 120, and Malbranche, 1997/1647: pp. 115-6). Indeed, it is suggestive that in 
one of the few explanations of maternal impressions in which the (usually unsatisfied) norm 
requiring physical contact was believed to be satisfied, disgust and contamination is clearly 
invoked. Quillet (1872/1656) posits that “filthy atoms” flow from ugly objects through the 
perceiver’s “pores” and “descend” on the womb to make the foetus grow “foully” (p. 63).    
A third reason why fright might have been believed to be the cause of maternal impressions 
is that the causes of maternal impression beliefs are likely to have elicited disgust and fear—since 
fear and disgust regularly co-occur (Woody & Teachman, 2000)—and fear and disgust can be 
difficult to accurately name as such, or distinguish from one another due to our relatively poor 
introspective acuity.  
Arachnophobia provides a clear example of this. Prior to 1990, it was largely thought that 
the response that underlay the aversion to spiders was fear or anxiety. Early investigations of the 
aversion asked people to self-report the extent to which they felt “frightened” by spiders (e.g. 
Bennett-Levy & Marteau, 1984), people commonly reported feeling “frightened” when asked to 
specify the affective nature of their aversion in an unstructured manner (e.g. Cornelius & Averill, 
1983), and prominent early theories of this aversion posited that we are pre-prepared to fear such 
animals because we evolved from mammals who would have been preyed upon by these animals 
(e.g. Öhman, 1986)—where predation is perhaps the paradigmatic kind of threat that fear evolved 
in response to. But, beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a range of evidence which did not 
rely on people’s awareness, or classification, of their own emotional state emerged which suggested 
that the response underlying the aversion to spiders was at least as much, if not more, based on 
disgust. To mention a few pieces of such evidence: Arachnophobes respond to spiders with the 
 
11 In discussions of maternal impressions in the 19th century medical literature, it was thought that maternal 
impressions might affect the development of the foetus through the blood—either through “agitation” of the blood 
or by disturbing foetal nutrition—rather than through the nerves, as it was known at this time that the nervous systems 
of the foetus and mother were not connected (see e.g. Lee, 1875). Another popular explanation in the 19th century 
medical literature was that maternal fright somehow arrested development in an early phase (see e.g. Clapperton, 1875: 
p. 169). 
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disgust facial expression (e.g., Vernon & Berenbaum, 2002), and represent them as contaminating 
(e.g. Mulkens et al., 1998). 
Notwithstanding the fact that fear may have accompanied some ostensible maternal 
impression events, and was appealed to in order to justify maternal impression beliefs generally, it 
is unlikely that fear is causally responsible for many maternal impression beliefs. Firstly, the 
majority of the causes identified in maternal impression beliefs are elicitors of disgust and not fear. 
To give just a few examples: the sight of congenital deformities, bodily injuries to others and the 
moralization of the ‘excessive’ desires of women (with the attendant idea that they express a 
woman’s animal nature) clearly point to disgust rather than fear. Nor does it seem likely that 
handling dead meat, caressing animals, or stealing cause fear, but these activities seem apt to cause 
disgust in a pregnant woman or observer. In all of these cases, the threat posed to the pregnant 
woman and her foetus is not of bodily injury from the outside (as fear is apt to respond to), but 
rather of contagion and damage from the inside (as disgust is apt to respond to). 
Second, setting aside fear’s inability to account for the range of causal events specified in 
maternal impression beliefs, a fear-based account cannot explain the other explananda discussed 
in §3, concerning the logic, distribution, and persistence of maternal impression beliefs. For 
example, a fear-based explanation cannot explain why the causes and effects are represented to be 
symmetrical—the experience of seeing a one-armed beggar was believed to produce a one-armed 
foetus, rather than a foetus that has been injured in an indiscriminate manner by the animal spirits 
becoming agitated, as would be expected if fear—and beliefs about its effect—were indeed playing 
a role in generating such beliefs. Nor can a fear-based explanation account for the self-other 
asymmetry we see in maternal impression beliefs. As we have seen, the sight of injuries to a 
pregnant woman’s own body did not tend to lead to maternal impression beliefs, but this is the 
opposite of what would be predicted on a fear-based account, since such injuries are apt to cause 
fear. Furthermore, fear cannot make sense of the mechanisms that were believed to deal with 
exposure to the causal events specified in maternal impression beliefs: washing and wiping are not 
effective means of dealing with the kind of threat that is posed by fearsome objects. Finally, even 
though fear is, like disgust, a basic emotion, and so operates in an automatic and mandatory 
manner, it is not thought to give rise to any representations that could satisfactorily explain the 
occurrence of maternal impression beliefs. As such it is difficult to see how a fear-based 
explanation of maternal impression beliefs could so elegantly and convincingly explain why 
maternal impression beliefs have occurred across cultures and epochs, and have proved so resistant 
to rational deflation. 
Many of same reasons explain why an explanation of maternal impression beliefs involving 
disgust is preferable to domain-general explanations. It might be argued that maternal impression 
beliefs are a product of the magical law of similarity, which is thought to be one form of the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman et al., 1982). On this explanation, deformed children 
resemble deformed adults, and so by the law of similarity it is wrongly inferred that there must be 
some deeper connection between them in reality. There is some plausibility to this suggestion. It 
has been shown that magical thinking—such as thinking in accordance with the laws of contagion 
and similarity—is more likely where control is desired and elusive (Gmelch, 1971), as surely applies 
in the case of pregnancy. However, since thoughts about disgusting things also obey the law of 
similarity (e.g. Rozin & Nemeroff, 1990), evidence for an explanation of maternal impressions 
beliefs based on similarity is also ipso facto evidence for a disgust-based explanation. As such, 
maternal impression beliefs may in fact be overdetermined: they may arise from the both the 
similarity and contagion functions that disgust operates according to. Importantly though, only an 
explanation featuring disgust is able to accommodate the other explananda, such as the methods 
of purification and the self-other logic specified in some maternal impression beliefs. 
It might also be proposed that maternal impression phenomena might be explained in 
terms of the effects of negative affect generally, such as attentional capture, rather than disgust-
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specific effects, in line with psychological explanations of urban legends (e.g. Fessler et al. 2014; 
Eriksson & Coultas, 2014) and blood-letting practices (Miton et al., 2015).  
 Miton et al. (2015), for example, support the idea that disgust, and specifically the 
attentional-capture it involves, might help to explain the wide distribution of blood-letting 
practices by showing that stories involving blood-letting as a treatment were more likely to be 
robustly transmitted in an experiment than stories involving control treatments. While it is likely 
that some features of negative emotions generally—such as the way that they capture attention—
have played a role in the persistence and distribution of maternal impression beliefs, such features 
underdetermine the content of maternal impression beliefs: attending to and remembering the 
sight of something that elicits a negative emotion is clearly insufficient for representing that 
experience as affecting an unborn child in an analogous manner. This central feature, together 
with, for example, the overrepresentation of disgust elicitors as causes and purification logic, 
suggests that disgust, and the specific contamination representations it generates, needs to be a 




In discussions of disgust and contamination thinking, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
architecture of the contamination thinking system. The occurrence of maternal impression beliefs 
provides an opportunity to evidence the architecture of the contamination system, and 
importantly, the radical promiscuity of contamination aliefs, and the constraints contamination norms 
impose on contamination beliefs. In turn, the account of the contamination system advanced here 
helps to provide a unified account of the maternal impression theory of teratology, and further 
clearly demonstrates how our beliefs, including our scientific beliefs, can be damaged—indeed 
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